The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 31-September 1, 2026, and the BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12-13, 2026, were remarkable. Iran received considerably more attention and support from members of both the groups, far more than anticipated. More consequential, however, was the shift in India’s stance on the United States-Israel war against Iran and Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Since Operation Sindoor (2025), India has faced a growing perception of diplomatic marginalisation. President Donald Trump in Washington, which was held in September 2026. At Samarkand on September 16, 2022, Mr.
One interpretation of this pivot in policy is that India may have signed on to the declaration to avoid alienating Mr. Putin to end the endless war in Ukraine can therefore be read as a counter-signal to Washington. its meaning was unmistakable Although the declaration did not name the U.S. or Israel. India reaffirmed its opposition to military strikes on Iran by endorsing the Bishkek Declaration, which condemned the attacks and reiterated support for Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Second, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made an unusually blunt appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin to bring Russia’s seemingly endless war in Ukraine to an end. Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, and thereby jeopardising their attendance at India’s BRICS summit. Without the two leaders, India’s presidency of BRICS this year would have been a complete failure. Meanwhile, Pakistan has gained diplomatic prominence through Washington’s selection of Islamabad as a mediator in the conflict with Iran, while several Gulf nations have sought defence agreements with Pakistan. Consequently, India needed a successful and high-profile BRICS summit, which it got. New Delhi has not abandoned Washington entirely While there is a shift in India’s policy. Mr. Modi’s public appeal to Mr. Had the message been intended only for Moscow, it could have been conveyed privately. Delivering it publicly suggested that Mr. Modi was also reassuring the West. India may have joined the SCO and BRICS consensus on Iran to secure a successful BRICS summit, but it was now leaning more toward the western position on Ukraine than before. Although Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi did not meet bilaterally at the SCO summit in Bishkek, they held talks on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in New Delhi. The meeting preceded Mr. Xi’s high-profile G2 summit with U.S. Neither summit declaration mentioned the war in Ukraine, avoiding criticism of Moscow even as Mr. Modi publicly urged Mr. Putin to end the conflict. India thus endorsed two declarations accommodating Russia’s position without fully embracing it. From Mr. Putin’s perspective, this was the second time that Mr. Modi had used what might be called ‘jumla’ (performative) diplomacy at Russia’s expense. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar subsequently repeated that phrase in western capitals to demonstrate that India’s purchase of discounted Russian oil did not signify political support for Russia’s invasion. Modi’s performative diplomacy designed to stay in the good books of Washington risks undermining the long enduring Russia-India friendship.
Modi told Mr. Putin that “today’s era is not an era of war”. Russia is now leaning ever more toward its “trusted partner” — China, while Mr.
