A controversial new power grab in Pakistan: A practical reader guide

A controversial new power grab in Pakistan: A practical reader guide

In Islamabad, the capital, authorities have blocked the roads with more than 2,000 shipping containers—some studded with nails. FOR WEEKS the news in Pakistan has been dominated by a to-and-fro over whether Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party would be allowed to stage a protest for their jailed hero. Supporters of the cricketer-turned-prime minister have issued rallying cries to show their undying loyalty. Ministers have responded with menace. At entry points to the city, bus-loads of truncheon-wielding policemen grin at frustrated motorists.

After talks between the PTI and the government ended in stalemate, the march eventually got under way on October 4th. They hope to pick up more supporters along the way, but have not yet decided whether to march on the capital. The whole circus will go on. His control of other appointments—still technically civilian decisions—is openly acknowledged. Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister, is widely seen as a puppet. The economy remains in a rut. After servicing debt and keeping his men in new uniforms, the federal government has little left over. In July it put up taxes on petrol; in September a big protest over the new levies was also postponed. The field marshal believes that his successes on the world stage have not been matched by his civilian colleagues at home, explains Faisal Vawda, a senator and former confidante of Mr Khan who is now close to the army. Outriders like Mr Vawda now openly castigate the current political class. The stated logic for radical reform is that current provinces are too big and too corrupt, and local governance is thus dire. This has some merit. Punjab has 128m people; rural citizens travel hours to settle a land dispute. Mr Zardari is thought to be one of Pakistan’s richest men. Mr Vawda predicts that there will be a national referendum on the proposal in the coming months, bypassing the need for provincial approval. Some see such a vote as a stepping stone to the field marshal establishing himself as a powerful executive president, as Pervez Musharraf did in the 2000s, after seizing power from a civilian government blighted by corruption and mismanagement. Yet it is not clear yet that the field marshal will have his way. He does not have much popular support, and may not want to alienate all of his political partners—especially while Mr Khan, who enjoys public adoration, sits in jail. Some in Mr Khan’s party even see an opportunity in the cracks emerging between the army and the government.

Around 5,000 of Mr Khan’s supporters set off from Lakki Marwat, 275km west of Islamabad in the PTI-run province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In September inflation was 10.3%, year-on-year. Because he is known to be the field marshal’s man, mohsin Naqvi, the interior minister, is considered more powerful,.

Despite amassing such power, the field marshal is frustrated, according to those who know him. “They have raped the country,” he says. Pakistanis invoke “Nawaz’s palace” and “Maryam’s plane” as symbols of a fantastically entitled ruling elite. In Sindh the PPP has turned corruption into an art form, says Muhammad Zubair, a former governor of the province (the party denies this). In private, Field Marshal Munir is said to be resolute. “We have been waiting for a black swan event,” says one former PTI minister.