On September 12, leaders of the BRICS grouping gathered at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi, with India holding the chair and, by extension, the pen. When BRICS came together in 2011, its five members contributed 20% of global GDP but held just 11% of the voting share at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Today, the expanded grouping accounts for nearly 40% of global GDP and 55% of the world’s population, but the voting share has barely expanded.
Because of global wars, both military and economic, this mechanism appeals to emerging economies, especially at a time when the volatility in foreign-exchange markets is sustained. The bank’s 2022-26 General Strategy commits to 30% of its lending and borrowing in member countries’ local currencies, even as the bulk of its lending and borrowing remains in dollars. Whatever local currency lending does exist is skewed heavily in favour of the Renminbi — just a few days ago, the NDB priced a ¥7 billion (~$1.04 billion) three-year Panda bond in the China Interbank bond market. In 2026, issuance of such bonds has gone up approximately 91% year-on-year, per Chinese data. Further, given the fact that the 2026 New Delhi Declaration did not feature a meaningful agreement on mobilising the NDB, India’s focus in BRICS next year should be on simpler fixes to local-currency challenges.
Established by the BRICS countries in 2015 to “mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging markets and developing countries,” the bank remains one of the grouping’s most tangible tools. First discussed in 2016, and subsequently slated for October 2023 and then for end-March 2026, the debut issuance was described by NDB President Dilma Rousseff in May as being at its “final stage,” two months after the bank floated a rupee bond programme to mobilise around ₹25,000 crore over five years. One area where BRICS can contribute the most meaningfully to the global financial order, without overtly threatening or challenging American predominance, is by expanding the efficiency and membership of the New Development Bank (NDB). It is also a noteworthy strength of the NDB that it has a marked preference for local-currency lending. It is an alternative way to reduce reliance on the dollar without replacing it as a currency for trade invoicing. It is time for India to push the long-delayed rupee bond over the line.
Yet, despite a decade in operation, the NDB has approved only 139 projects worth about $43 billion, distributed mostly among its core members. Its like-for-like counterpart, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established around the same time, has meanwhile gathered 111 approved members and committed about $69 billion across 350 projects, backed by a AAA credit rating that the NDB cannot easily attain. This is coupled with an exceptionally slow disbursement rate; only about $20 billion of approved loans had been disbursed, according to the bank’s own count. What is ironic is that even as Moscow and Beijing champion de-dollarisation, including through the Bank, the NDB has extended no new credit to Russia since March 2022 to protect its AA/AA+ credit rating. The NDB has also opened its doors to new members, allowing for a fresh infusion of capital, but the founders’ collective voting share cannot fall below 55%. It has secured commitments of nearly $10 billion across 32 projects, including metro rail systems and the Delhi-Ghaziabad-Meerut RRTS corridor. Graphic Data Source: NDB; Investor Presentation June 2026 & Annual Report 2025; created by the authors)
Stagnant asset growth continues to restrict its lending capacity. One pathway to breaking this asset bottleneck would be for the five countries to increase their paid-up capital. However, severe domestic and geopolitical constraints mean that not all founders can match higher commitments — most notably, Russia, which is heavily sanctioned. Sanctions have also strained the bank’s credit standing and dollar funding costs. And since the bank’s rules mandate equal voting shares among the founders, any capital expansion is effectively held hostage by its financially weakest link. Regardless of how the bottleneck is resolved, there is merit in reprioritising the NDB within BRICS. So far, the bank has served Delhi well. It is not a small feat, but expanding the NDB’s operations to be on par with other multilateral lenders would require extending such a bargain to many more emerging markets and developing countries. (Amit Kumar and Anushka Saxena are researchers at the Takshashila Institution. Views are personal to the authors and do not represent those of the Institution.
