Swedish politics is seldom thrilling. Yet in recent weeks the general election scheduled for September 13th has become as gripping as a Stieg Larsson mystery. The polls have been tightening relentlessly. Then, last week, the race was shaken by reports that an official in the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats party has worrying links to Russia.
Polina Malaberg, a Russian-born naturalised Swede and longtime SD aide (currently on the Riksdag’s important Constitutional Committee), reportedly accompanied a party MP in 2017 on a trip to Moscow funded by the Russian government, and has since been involved in various networks in Sweden with links to Russian intelligence services. Because of its neo-Nazi past, they have influence over policy (especially on migration), but are not formally part of the coalition; other parties have long shunned the SD. Should the Liberals squeeze in, their seats could allow the right to stay in power. This time, however, the government would have a more radical complexion. The current minority government, led by the Moderates, relies on a confidence-and-supply deal with the SD. Now the Social Democrats have received an unexpected boost. On September 3rd Expo, an investigative publication (founded, as it happens, by the late Larsson), alleged that a highly placed SD official was linked to Russian influence operations. Ms Malaberg has declined to respond to requests for comment.
In any new coalition, the SD says it would insist on formal membership and on holding important ministries. The SD says she passed a security check when hired, and that it is investigating the allegations.
The report drew immediate denunciations of the SD from across the political spectrum. We are in a European war. That may be overstating the risks, reckons a senior security official. There is no suggestion Ms Malaberg ever had access to or passed on classified information, and it is not uncommon for ethnic Russians in the diaspora to air nationalist views on social media. The Kremlin would have little to gain: there is a broad consensus in support of Ukraine across all Sweden’s political parties, including the SD. Yet he may face some scepticism in convincing voters of that. cranks of both sorts regularly pop out of the woodwork Although he has worked hard to rid the party of neo-Nazis and pro-Russian extremists. Any hint of Russian links could cost the SD enough votes to swing the outcome of a tight election. Sometimes influence operations exert influence in the wrong direction.
Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency, established in 2022 to counter foreign influence operations and disinformation, says Russia is the primary threat to the integrity of the election, but reckons that Sweden is not currently a priority target for Russia. Support for Ukraine runs deep in Sweden, as does opposition to Russia: just 5% of Swedes said they view the country favourably, according to a poll by Pew.
Ulf Kristersson, the prime minister, told Aftonbladet, a Swedish newspaper, that if the allegations are true then Ms Malaberg should be fired: “There is no room for pro-Russian narratives in Sweden. Peter Hultqvist, the defence spokesman for the Social Democrats, called it “an infiltration attempt” by a foreign power and a “crisis for Swedish security”. Jimmie Akesson, the SD’s leader (pictured, on balloon), has tried hard to distance the party from the scandal, insisting it has no space for “Putin’s friends”.
That party, a member of the current government, had been expected to miss the 4% threshold and drop out of the Riksdag, Sweden’s parliament. They are now polling at around 28%, and are at risk of suffering their worst-ever election result. (In 2018 they got 28.3%.) Their chances of forming a centre-left coalition have narrowed further due to a bounce in support for the centre-right Liberals. Yet in the past few months the Social Democrats’ lead has shrunk. Their hard line on immigration has pushed some progressive voters to defect to smaller parties to their left.
